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Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie
Adam N. Steinman*
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Atlantic Marine clarified several things
about the enforcement of forum-selection clauses in federal court. But something
important was missing from Justice Alito’s opinion—the Erie doctrine. Erie, of course,
helps to determine the applicability of state law in federal court, and state law
potentially has a lot to say about contractual forum-selection clauses. Indeed, Erie was
front and center the last time the Court confronted the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses in federal court, when it decided Stewart Organization v. Ricoh a quarter
century ago.
This article examines the Atlantic Marine decision through the lens of Erie, and
explores the role that Erie and state law should play in the Atlantic Marine framework.
Atlantic Marine may appear at first glance to mandate virtually unflinching
enforcement of forum-selection clauses. But Justice Alito’s approach in Atlantic
Marine applies only when the forum-selection clause is “contractually valid.” Properly
understood, Erie requires federal courts to look to state law to decide this question—at
least in diversity cases. To allow federal courts to disregard state law in applying
Atlantic Marine would raise several troubling Erie concerns: geographic relocation
contrary to what would occur in state court; changing the substantive law that would
govern the ultimate merits of the litigation in state court; and overriding state contract
law and contractual remedies via the sort of federal common law that Erie forbids.

* Frank M. Johnson Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of
Law. This Article benefitted greatly from discussions with the other participants at this symposium—
Andrew Bradt, Kevin Clermont, Scott Dodson, Robin Effron, Mary Kay Kane, Rick Marcus, Linda
Mullenix, Steve Sachs, Brad Shannon, and Jim Wagstaffe. I am also grateful to Jenny Carroll and
Heather Elliott for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to the editors of the
Hastings Law Journal, both for organizing a fantastic symposium and for their excellent editorial work
on this Article.

[795]

Steinman-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

796

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/23/2015 5:07 PM

[Vol. 66:795

Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 796
I. The ATLANTIC MARINE Decision ............................................................. 797
II. Federal Courts, State Law: ERIE and Its Choices ........................ 802
III. ERIE and Forum-Selection Clauses................................................. 804
IV. ERIE and 28 U.S.C. § 1404 ................................................................... 810
V. Extraordinary Circumstances: When Might a Federal Court
Refuse to Enforce a Valid Forum-Selection Clause?................. 816
Conclusion: ATLANTIC MARINE and State Law ....................................... 818
Introduction
In his opinion for the Court in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v.
U.S. District Court,1 Justice Alito neither cited nor discussed Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 Yet forum-selection clauses implicate
precisely the sort of vertical choice-of-law issues that are at the heart of
the Erie doctrine. Indeed, the choice between state law and federal law
was front-and-center the last time the Supreme Court addressed the
relationship between forum-selection clauses and the federal venuetransfer statutes. In its 1988 decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.,3 the Court seemed to declare that state law regarding such clauses
plays no role in deciding whether a transfer of venue is justified under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).4
Given Atlantic Marine’s silence on the potential role of state law
with respect to forum-selection clauses, it is worth examining that
decision’s framework through the lens of Erie. Properly understood,
Atlantic Marine opens the door for state law to play a more significant
role than many anticipated in the wake of Stewart. Most significantly,
Justice Alito recognized that the enforcement of a forum-selection clause
via a § 1404(a) venue-transfer motion (or a forum non conveniens
motion, for that matter) hinges on a determination that the forumselection clause is “contractually valid.”5
There are strong arguments that state law should govern the
question of whether a forum-selection clause is contractually valid, and
that a federal court should not have freestanding authority to displace
state law on contractual validity with its own preferred approach. This

1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
4. See id. at 27, 30 n.9 (“[A] district court sitting in diversity must apply a federal statute that
controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid exercise of Congress’ constitutional
powers. . . . Our determination that § 1404(a) governs the parties’ dispute notwithstanding any contrary
Alabama policy makes it unnecessary to address the contours of state law.”).
5. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.5.
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would be in some tension with Stewart, admittedly. But intervening
developments in the Supreme Court’s approach to the Erie doctrine—in
addition to lines of argument that the Stewart majority did not address—
bolster the case that state law, not federal law, should govern whether a
forum-selection clause is contractually valid. Accordingly, Atlantic Marine
does not mandate unflinching enforcement of forum-selection clauses
without any mechanism for parties to raise legitimate concerns about the
use and operation of such clauses in certain contexts. Rather, Atlantic
Marine should be read to defer to state law on such matters.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the Atlantic
Marine decision. Part II briefly describes Erie and the vertical choice-oflaw frameworks that have sprung up around that venerable, perhaps
mythical,6 decision. Part III assesses whether Erie demands the application
of state contract law in determining the contractual validity of a forumselection clause, while Part IV addresses whether the general authority
to transfer venue provided by § 1404(a) justifies federalizing the issue of
contract validity. Part V considers Justice Alito’s recognition that
“extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the
parties”7 may permit a federal court to deny a § 1404(a) motion despite a
contractually valid forum-selection clause, and explores how such an
inquiry would fit within the Erie framework. Part VI concludes by
synthesizing these arguments to explain how federal courts should
approach forum-selection clauses in light of Erie and Atlantic Marine.

I. The ATLANTIC MARINE Decision
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Marine, written by Justice
Alito for a unanimous Court, addressed a number of issues relating to
the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. The case began in a Texas
federal district court, where J-Crew Management, Inc. (a Texas
corporation) sued Atlantic Marine Construction Co. (a Virginia
corporation).8 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).9 Atlantic Marine had contracted with the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to build a child development center at Fort
Hood in Texas, and Atlantic Marine had entered into a subcontract with
J-Crew.10 J-Crew’s lawsuit sought nearly $160,000 for Atlantic Marine’s

6. See generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974)
(arguing against the “myth” that Erie “carried some special constitutional magic”).
7. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575, 581.
8. Id. at 575.
9. Id. at 576.
10. Id. at 575.
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failure to pay under the subcontract.11 That subcontract contained the
following forum-selection clause:
[J-Crew] agrees that all . . . disputes . . . shall be litigated in the Circuit
Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. The
Parties hereto expressly consent to the jurisdiction and venue of said
courts.12

Atlantic Marine sought to enforce the forum-selection clause via a
number of alternative means. First, it asked that the case be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3),13 which authorizes
dismissal for “improper venue.”14 Second, Atlantic Marine sought
transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406,15
which authorizes transfer from a venue that is “wrong” to a venue where
the case “could have been brought.”16 Third, Atlantic Marine sought
transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),17
which provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented.”18
The federal district court in Texas denied all these requests, and
Atlantic Marine petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss or
transfer the case. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition, noting that
Atlantic Marine was required to show a “clear and indisputable” right to
the issuance of the writ.19 According to the Fifth Circuit, Atlantic Marine
failed to satisfy this standard because the district court “did not clearly
abuse its discretion” either in considering the forum-selection clause

11. Joint Appendix at 9, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (alleging an unpaid balance of
$159,675.87).
12. United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 2012 WL 8499879, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012).
13. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for “improper venue”).
15. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).
17. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
19. In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 2012) (“With respect to the second
requirement—that the petitioner’s right to issuance of the writ must be ‘clear and indisputable’—this Court
has made clear that ‘we are not to issue a writ to correct a mere abuse of discretion, even though such might
be reversible on a normal appeal.’ Instead, we will only grant mandamus relief when errors ‘produce a
patently erroneous result’ and ‘clearly exceed[] the bounds of judicial discretion.’” (quoting In re Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 545 F. 3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
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under § 1404(a) or in conducting its § 1404(a) analysis.20 Atlantic Marine
then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the
Court granted.21
The Supreme Court first addressed the proper procedural vehicles
for enforcing a forum-selection clause. Justice Alito’s opinion held that
such a clause cannot be enforced by either a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to
dismiss or a 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) motion to transfer. He explained: “Section
1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) allow dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or
‘improper.’ Whether venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends exclusively
on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the
requirements of federal venue laws, and those provisions say nothing
about a forum-selection clause.”22 In Atlantic Marine, of course, the
Western District of Texas was a proper venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2) because the parties entered into the contract in that district
and it was to be performed there (where Fort Hood was located).23
So what motion should a party seeking to enforce a forum-selection
clause file? If the forum-selection clause points to another federal district,
a party may file a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).24 Section
1404(a), Justice Alito explained, “permits transfer to any district where
venue is also proper (i.e., ‘where [the case] might have been brought’) or
to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract or
stipulation.”25 If the forum-selection clause points to a state court or a
foreign forum, a party may file a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.26 Prompted by an amicus brief filed by fellow symposium
contributor Stephen Sachs, the Court also acknowledged the view that a
party may enforce a forum-selection clause by filing a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6); but the Court declined to resolve this question

20. Id. (“Atlantic urges that the district court clearly abused its discretion (1) by considering
enforcement of the forum-selection clause under § 1404(a), instead of under Rule 12(b)(3) and § 1406,
and (2) by committing errors when conducting its analysis under § 1404(a). Because we find the
district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in either respect, we deny Atlantic’s petition.”).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Atlantic Marine did not address whether the
prerequisites for the “extraordinary” writ of mandamus were present. Cf. Cheney v. United States
District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (“This is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for
really extraordinary causes.’” (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947))).
21. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 576; see also Atl. Marine, 133 S. Ct. 1748, 1748 (2013) (granting writ
of certiorari).
22. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577.
23. Id. at 576 n.1.
24. Id. at 579 (“Section 1404(a) . . . provides a mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection
clauses that point to a particular federal district.”).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 580 (“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or
foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”); see also id. at 583 n.8 (noting that the
approach to § 1404(a) forum-selection-clause transfers should also “apply to motions to dismiss for forum
non conveniens in cases involving valid forum-selection clauses pointing to state or foreign forums”).
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because Atlantic Marine had never filed such a motion and neither party
addressed in their briefing whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would have
been proper.27
Justice Alito’s opinion then turned to how a court should evaluate a
§ 1404(a) motion that is “premised on a forum-selection clause.”28 The
answer is that, “when the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection
clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum
specified in that clause. Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated
to the convenience of the parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”29 I
have placed emphasis on the word “valid” in the first sentence of this
quotation, because Justice Alito emphasized it as well—not with italics
but rather with footnote 5 of the opinion, which appears at the end of
that sentence. Footnote 5 states: “Our analysis presupposes a contractually
valid forum-selection clause.”30
The opinion does not address how a court should decide whether a
forum-selection clause is valid. I hope to provide some preliminary
thoughts on that question in this Article. It is clear, however, that the
Atlantic Marine opinion itself places no restrictions on a court’s
assessment of contractual validity in the first instance.
Assuming a contractually valid forum-selection clause exists, how
should a federal court analyze a § 1404(a) motion or a forum non
conveniens motion seeking to enforce that clause? Justice Alito began by
acknowledging the factors that govern such motions as a general matter.
One set of factors involve “the parties’ private interests,” which include:
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.31

A court should also consider “[p]ublic-interest factors,” which include
“the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the law.”32 In addition, a court must “give some weight to the
plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”33
When such a motion is based on a valid forum-selection clause,
however, a court must approach the motion differently. First, as Justice
27. Id. at 580 (“Petitioner, however, did not file a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), and the parties did not
brief the Rule’s application to this case at any stage of this litigation. We therefore will not consider it.”).
28. Id. at 581.
29. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 581 n.5.
31. Id. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)).
32. Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6).
33. Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6).
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Alito explained, “the plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight.”34
Because the plaintiff is “the party defying the forum-selection clause,”
the plaintiff is the one that “bears the burden of establishing that transfer
to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted.”35
Second, the court must not refuse to enforce a valid forum-selection
clause based on “arguments about the parties’ private interests.”36
Parties to such a clause “waive the right to challenge the preselected
forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their
witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”37 With such private
interest factors off the table, “a district court may consider arguments
about public-interest factors only.”38 This leaves any party resisting a
valid forum-selection clause with a daunting challenge. Justice Alito
wrote that public interest factors alone “will rarely defeat a transfer
motion.”39 Accordingly, “forum-selection clauses should control except in
unusual cases. Although it is conceivable in a particular case that the
district court would refuse to transfer a case notwithstanding the
counterweight of a forum-selection clause, such cases will not be
common.”40 Later in the opinion, Justice Alito summed it up this way:
“As the party acting in violation of the forum-selection clause, J-Crew
must bear the burden of showing that public-interest factors
overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.”41
There is one final way that a § 1404(a) motion based on a forumselection clause differs from other § 1404(a) motions. When a § 1404(a)
motion is granted based on a valid forum-selection clause, the “transfer
of venue will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”42
Rather, the transferee court (the one designated in the forum-selection
clause) will apply its own choice-of-law rules. Because of Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Manufacturing Co.,43 this means the transferee court will follow
the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is located.44 This deviates
from the rule that has generally governed § 1404(a) motions for the last
half-century. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,45 the Court held that when a case

34. Id. at 581.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 582.
37. Id.; see also id. at 584 (“[J-Crew] promised to resolve its disputes in Virginia, and the District
Court should not have given any weight to J-Crew’s current claims of inconvenience.”).
38. Id. at 582.
39. Id.
40. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 583.
42. Id. at 582.
43. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
44. Id. at 496 (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must
conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.” (citation omitted)).
45. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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is transferred under § 1404(a), “the transferee district court must be
obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied if there
had been no change of venue.”46 Justice Alito made clear in Atlantic
Marine that the Van Dusen rule does not apply “to cases where a
defendant’s motion is premised on enforcement of a valid forum-selection
clause.”47
With this summary of the Atlantic Marine decision in mind, let us
turn to Erie.

II. Federal Courts, State Law: ERIE and Its Choices
Few Supreme Court decisions are as iconic as Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.48 The overarching question of whether a federal court is
bound to follow state law, however, implicates a variety of distinct
doctrines whose relationship to Erie—and to each other—is far from
clear.49 The Erie decision itself purported to be based on a constitutional
constraint on the power of the federal judiciary.50 Although Justice
Brandeis’s opinion was opaque about the content and scope of this
limitation, one way to understand Erie’s constitutional core is this: If the
sole basis for federal judicial lawmaking is that federal courts may
adjudicate a particular dispute, such lawmaking cannot dictate the
substantive rights that are the basis for the adjudication.51 This explains
the basic conclusion in Erie that the mere existence of diversity
jurisdiction did not authorize a federal court to displace the duty of care
imposed by state tort law.52 The same principle applies with respect to

46. Id. at 639; see also Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (citing Van Dusen as “requiring that the state
law applicable in the original court also apply in the transferee court”).
47. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583. There was no need for Justice Alito to create a special exception
from Van Dusen in cases where a forum-selection clause is enforced via a forum non conveniens
motion, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, because Van Dusen does not apply in the context of
forum non conveniens. See Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (“The reasoning employed in Van
Dusen v. Barrack is simply inapplicable to dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens.”).
48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 306 (2008) (“[P]rofound
uncertainties still exist about Erie’s source, its scope, and its relationship to other important issues
relating to federalism and judicial power.”); id. at 306–16 (describing “Erie’s problems”).
50. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.”). For arguments that Erie should be understood as resting on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds, see Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules:
An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev. 707, 713 (2006); Ely, supra
note 6, at 718; Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 595, 596 (2008); Martin H.
Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate
Dilemma, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 357–60 (1977); Allan D. Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection,
48 Iowa L. Rev. 248, 254 (1963).
51. Steinman, supra note 49, at 316.
52. Id.
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federal procedural lawmaking: the mere authority to develop procedures
for adjudicating disputes is not a sufficient basis for the federal judiciary
to impose federal substantive law.53
Operating in tandem with this constitutional core are two other
frameworks for choosing between state and federal law. Even if federal
judicial lawmaking would not displace truly substantive state law rights, a
federal court might still be obligated to follow state law. This is reflected
in the principle that federal courts should follow state law in order to
vindicate Erie’s “twin aims” of discouraging forum shopping and
inequitable administration of laws.54 This inquiry might be called a “subErie” choice, because (1) it is not constitutionally mandated (unlike Erie’s
core principle), and (2) opting for a federal rule would not displace state
substantive law.55
There is also a choice-of-law framework that operates in cases
where there is a sufficient federal interest to justify federal judicial
lawmaking that displaces substantive state law. As the Supreme Court’s
“classic” federal common law cases recognize, substantive judicial
lawmaking by federal courts is not improper per se; it merely requires
the presence of a “uniquely federal interest.”56 But the presence of such
a federal interest alone does not eliminate the role of state law. The
federal court would need to inquire whether state law should be
incorporated into federal common law. On a number of occasions, the
Supreme Court has concluded that, although federal common law
governs a particular issue, state law would provide the “federally
prescribed rule of decision.”57 Incorporation of state law into federal
common law is appropriate unless a “significant conflict exists between

53. Id. at 316–17.
54. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
55. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 323–24. That Erie’s twin aims are not constitutionally
mandated is confirmed by the fact that the existence of a governing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or
federal statute can permit a federal court to disregard state law regardless of the potential impact on
forum shopping or the inequitable administration of laws. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 415–16 (2010) (noting that applying a federal rule that induces
forum shopping “is unacceptable when it comes as the consequence of judge-made rules created to fill
supposed ‘gaps’ in positive federal law” but that “a Federal Rule governing procedure [adopted
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act] is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a way
that induces forum shopping” (emphasis added)).
56. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 306–08, 317–19 (discussing, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)).
57. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (holding that
“federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in
diversity” but “adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by
state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits”); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) (holding that “federal courts should incorporate state law into
federal common law” to fill “a gap in the federal securities laws”).
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an identifiable federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state
law,”58 or there is a “need for a nationally uniform body of law.”59

III. ERIE and Forum-Selection Clauses
In analyzing the relationship between Erie and forum-selection
clauses, the crucial question is whether a federal court should be
permitted to reach a different conclusion about the enforcement of a
forum-selection clause than a state court would. To allow such a disparity
between federal and state courts would raise three distinct but partially
overlapping concerns under Erie. The first is a relocation concern: if a
state court decides the forum-selection clause issue, the case will be
adjudicated in State A; but if a federal court decides the forum-selection
clause issue, the case will be adjudicated in State B. The second is a
horizontal choice-of-law concern: if a state court decides the forum-selection
clause issue, the case will be adjudicated according to the substantive law
that would apply in State A (using State A’s choice-of-law rules); but if a
federal court decides the forum-selection clause issue, the case will be
adjudicated according to the substantive law that would apply in State B
(using State B’s choice-of-law rules). The third is a vertical substantive
law concern: the validity of a forum-selection clause and the appropriate
remedies for its enforcement are fundamentally questions of substantive
contract law, for which state law must be followed just like other private
law issues traditionally governed by state law (such as the defendant’s
duty of care in a tort case like Erie itself). This Part examines these potential
Erie problems in more detail.
Let us first address the relocation concern. Imagine that a plaintiff
wishes to sue in State A, but the forum-selection clause requires disputes
to proceed in State B. If a State A state court and a State A federal court
take opposite views of a contractual forum-selection clause, then the
choice between state and federal court means the difference between
having the case adjudicated in State A or in State B. Although geography
alone might not implicate truly substantive rights, it may contravene the
“twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”60 To have a federal
rule that allows plaintiffs to evade forum-selection clauses that would be
binding in state court—or to allow defendants to compel the enforcement
of forum-selection clauses that would be invalid in state court—would

58. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509
(examining whether a particular state law “is incompatible with federal interests”).
59. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); see also Semtek, 531 U.S. at
508 (noting that there was “no need for a uniform federal rule”).
60. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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seem to encourage precisely the sort of vertical forum shopping Erie is
meant to discourage.
According to Justice Scalia, in fact, it is “inevitabl[e]” that such
differences would provide a “significant encouragement to forum
shopping.”61 As Justice Scalia explained in his Stewart dissent, “[v]enue
is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency with
which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit might well
not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly less
convenient forum.”62
Justice Scalia found that a different federal approach to forumselection clauses “fails the second part of the twin-aims test as well,
producing inequitable administration of the laws.”63 He wrote in Stewart:
The decision of an important legal issue should not turn on the
accident of diversity of citizenship, or the presence of a federal
question unrelated to that issue. It is difficult to imagine an issue of
more importance, other than one that goes to the very merits of the
lawsuit, than the validity of a contractual forum-selection provision.64

He then observed: “Certainly, the Erie doctrine has previously been held
to require the application of state law on subjects of similar or obviously
lesser importance,”65 giving as examples “whether filing of complaint or
service tolls statute of limitations,”66 “arbitrability,”67 and “indemnity
bond[s] for litigation expenses.”68
Although Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in Stewart, the
majority did not disagree with him on these points. Rather, Justice
Marshall’s majority opinion in Stewart concluded that encouraging
forum shopping was irrelevant because § 1404(a) “control[led] the
issue.”69 As explained below, however, the Stewart majority’s attitude
toward the preemptive scope of § 1404(a) is hard to square with more

61. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 39–40. Elaborating on the sort of forum shopping that was likely to occur in connection
with forum-selection clauses, Justice Scalia wrote:
[I]n a State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a
clause will be encouraged to sue in state court, and nonresident defendants will be
encouraged to shop for more favorable law by removing to federal court. In the reverse
situation—where a State has law favorable to enforcing such clauses—plaintiffs will be
encouraged to sue in federal court.

Id. at 40.
63. Id.
64. Id. (internal citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)).
67. Id. at 41 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202–04 (1956)).
68. Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949)).
69. Id. at 31 (majority opinion); see also id. at 32 n.11 (“Because a validly enacted Act of
Congress controls the issue in dispute, we have no occasion to evaluate the impact of application of
federal judge-made law on the ‘twin aims’ that animate the Erie doctrine.”).
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recent Supreme Court opinions on the Erie doctrine. If, instead,
§ 1404(a) must be interpreted to accommodate state law regarding
forum-selection clauses, Justice Scalia’s concerns about the effect of
relocation on Erie’s twin aims become dispositive.
Indeed, this tension with Erie’s twin aims existed even though,
according to the Stewart majority, the basic Van Dusen rule would apply
in the forum-selection clause situation: a § 1404(a) transfer to the court
designated in the forum-selection clause would not have made any
change in the substantive law that would govern the dispute.70 That is—
as Justice Scalia argued in his Stewart dissent—the relocation alone would
offend Erie’s twin aims. Atlantic Marine compounds the potential Erie
problem by declaring, for the first time, that Van Dusen does not apply
when a § 1404(a) transfer is based on a valid forum-selection clause:
“The court in the contractually selected venue should not apply the law
of the transferor venue to which the parties waived their right.”71
Atlantic Marine, therefore, creates a second Erie concern—a
horizontal choice-of-law concern. Not only will different approaches to
forum-selection clauses mean that a case will proceed in a different
geographic location depending on whether it is filed in state court or
federal court, but those different approaches can also lead to a disparity
in the substantive law that will ultimately govern the dispute between the
parties. Such a disparity flies in the face of the Erie-driven choice-of-law
framework reflected in Klaxon, Van Dusen, and other Supreme Court
cases.
The basic rule under Klaxon is that a federal court applies the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is located.72 Erie required that
approach, the Klaxon Court explained, because “[a]ny other ruling
would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state upon
which [Erie] is based”; “the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and
federal courts sitting side by side.”73
Van Dusen’s approach to choice of law in the § 1404(a) context is
similarly motivated by the Erie-inspired need to “ensure that the
‘accident’ of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to
utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have
been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed.”74

70. Id. at 32 (emphasizing that “a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) does not carry with it a change in
the applicable law” (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964))).
71. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013).
72. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“[T]he prohibition declared in Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins extends . . . to the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal
court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.” (citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 496–97 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938)).
74. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638.
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Imagine a case that is filed in State A federal court and then transferred
to State B federal court under § 1404(a). If that case had instead been
filed in State A state court—where § 1404(a) does not permit a transfer
to a court in another state—the State A court would use its own choiceof-law rules to determine the substantive law that would ultimately apply
to the dispute. Van Dusen makes sure that the same law would apply in
federal court, by requiring the State B federal court—which is hearing
the case solely because of a § 1404(a) transfer—to apply the substantive
law that would apply in State A. As Van Dusen explained, “the critical
identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which
decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed.”75
More recently, in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,76 the Supreme Court
clarified that the Van Dusen rule applies even if the plaintiff requests the
§ 1404(a) transfer. As Justice Kennedy explained in Ferens, “§ 1404(a)
should not deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist absent
diversity jurisdiction.”77 This policy “has its real foundation in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.”78 He continued:
The Erie rule remains a vital expression of the federal system and the
concomitant integrity of the separate States . . . . “In essence, the intent
of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”79

To adopt a choice-of-law approach where a § 1404(a) transfer leads to
the application of different substantive law “would undermine the Erie
rule in a serious way. It would mean that initiating a transfer under
§ 1404(a) changes the state law applicable to a diversity case.”80
To allow different treatment of forum-selection clauses in state
court and federal court would produce precisely this problematic result;
it would “deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist absent
diversity jurisdiction”81 and destroy the “critical identity . . . between the

75. Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
76. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 524 (internal citation omitted).
79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
80. Id. at 526.
81. Id. at 523. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ferens did make the following observation:
“We have held, in an isolated circumstance, that § 1404(a) may pre-empt state law.” Id. at 526 (citing
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that federal law determines the
validity of a forum-selection clause). But he recognized in the very next sentence—relying explicitly on
Justice Scalia’s Stewart dissent—that, “[i]n general . . . we have seen § 1404(a) as a housekeeping
measure that should not alter the state law governing a case under Erie.” Id. (citing Van Dusen v.
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federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in
which the action was filed.”82 First, consider the situation where a state
court would dismiss a case pursuant to a forum-selection clause but a
federal court would not. A plaintiff sues in State A, but the forumselection clause requires disputes to proceed in State B. In State A state
court, which would enforce the forum-selection clause, the case would be
dismissed for refiling in State B, where the case will be governed by the
substantive law that would govern in State B. In federal court, however,
the case would remain in the State A federal court and—under Klaxon—
would be governed by the substantive law that would govern in State A.
We would have exactly the same disparity that Van Dusen and Ferens
refused to tolerate.
An identical problem would arise if the federal court would enforce
the forum-selection clause but the state court would not. If filed in State
A state court, the case would remain there and would be governed by the
substantive law that would apply in State A. If filed in State A federal
court, however, the court would transfer the case to State B federal
court; under Atlantic Marine, the State B federal court would apply the
substantive law that would apply in State B.83
The third and final Erie concern is independent of the substantive
law that will ultimately govern the parties’ dispute. This concern, rather,
is the substantive law by which the effect of the forum-selection clause
itself is determined. The effect of a forum-selection clause raises issues of
contract law that are quintessentially the realm of state law. For a federal
court to displace state contract law is arguably a classic interference with
state law substantive rights in violation of Erie. Just as a federal court
could not disregard state tort law and declare its own standard of care for
the duty owed by the Erie Railroad Co. toward Mr. Tompkins,84 a
federal court may not disregard state contract law and declare its own
standard of contract validity for forum-selection clauses.85 To have a
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding the language
of § 1404(a) “plainly insufficient” to work a change in the applicable state law through pre-emption)).
Indeed, as explained below, giving § 1404(a) the sort of preemptive scope suggested by Stewart
is inconsistent with more recent Erie doctrine decisions. See infra notes 102–114 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the § 1404(a) transfer envisioned in Stewart would not have resulted in a change to the
substantive law. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Under Atlantic Marine, the substantive law
would change. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013).
82. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
83. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
84. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 81–82 (1938) (Butler, J., concurring) (describing
how the lower court in Erie disregarded decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding the
duty owed to the plaintiff).
85. It is an open question, of course, as to what qualifies as truly substantive rights for this
purpose. This issue has evaded doctrinal clarity in the analogous context of when a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure impermissibly abridges, enlarges, or modifies substantive rights. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) (2012). Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
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federal approach to such contract questions trump the state law approach
not only invites forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws
(for all the reasons discussed above), it may also implicate Erie’s
constitutional core.86
Admittedly, displacement of state law might be permissible if it is
justified by a uniquely federal interest.87 But that interest must be more
than merely the fact that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the case
in which the forum-selection clause is invoked.88 That interest must be
more than merely the fact that federal courts have authority to develop
procedures for adjudicating a case,89 including procedures for resolving
whether a forum-selection clause mandates a particular course of action.
That interest must be more than merely the federal court’s view that a
different standard for contract validity would be more desirable.90
For some kinds of cases, a sufficient federal interest may well exist.
Where a forum-selection clause impacts federal law claims, a federal
interest may justify deviating from state law with respect to the

406–15 (2010) (Scalia, J.), with id. at 417–28 (Stevens, J., concurring) (each offering different
interpretations of the Rules Enabling Act’s substantive rights provisions). Arguably, the Rules
Enabling Act’s substantive rights provision and the constitutional core of Erie are one and the same.
See Steinman, supra note 49, at 324 (“If [a] Federal Rule does not override substantive rights, then it
passes muster under both the Rules Enabling Act and Erie’s constitutional core.”). But cf. id. at 324–
25 n.427 (recognizing that there may be a mismatch in federal question cases between federal common
law authority and rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act). And state law itself may play a
role in determining whether a particular aspect of state law is, or is not, substantive. See, e.g., Kermit
Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove,
106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 11–14 (2012). Even if one concludes that the contractual validity of a forumselection clause does not override state law substantive rights with respect to the forum-selection clause
itself, the practical consequences of giving different effect to such clauses in state and federal court—in
terms of relocation and a change in the substantive law that will govern the dispute—raise significant
Erie concerns on their own. See supra pp. 806–08.
86. Justice Scalia’s Stewart dissent alluded to this point as well when he wrote, at the end of his
paragraph discussing the potential for inequitable administration of laws, “[n]or can or should courts
ignore that issues of contract validity are traditionally matters governed by state law.” Stewart, 487
U.S. at 41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (“The vesting of
jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal
common law . . . .”); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)
(“This principle [that a jurisdictional grant alone does justify federal common law] follows from Erie
itself, where, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases, we held that the federal
courts did not possess the power to develop a concomitant body of general federal law.”); Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 922–23 (1986)
(arguing that Erie “clearly rejects the proposition that a court can make federal common law simply
because it has jurisdiction”).
89. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 317 (“[T]he mere authority to develop procedures for
adjudicating disputes is not a sufficient basis for the federal judiciary to impose federal substantive
law.”); see also id. at 288–93, 290 n.256 (explaining how a different federal approach to summary
judgment could interfere with state substantive law).
90. See id. at 327–28, 328 n.439.
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contractual validity of that clause.91 This may explain, for example, why
the Supreme Court has declared—in cases like The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.92 and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute93—that federal
law governs forum-selection clauses in admiralty cases.94 It is also
possible that particular situations presented by particular cases (the
“extraordinary circumstances” Justice Alito alluded to in Atlantic Marine)
might justify federal displacement of state contract law.95 But it is hard to
see why, as a general matter, there is a uniquely federal interest that
allows federal courts to disregard state law on the contractual validity of
forum-selection clauses.
Moreover, even if federal common law does govern the contractual
validity of a forum-selection clause, courts must consider whether federal
common law should incorporate state law. As discussed above,
incorporation of state law is appropriate unless a significant conflict
exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation
of state law, or there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law.96 The
Supreme Court has taken this requirement seriously. For example, even
though it concluded that “federal common law governs the claimpreclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity,” the
Court held that such federal common law should “adopt[], as the
federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by
state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits.”97

IV. ERIE and 28 U.S.C. § 1404
One possible retort to the argument that state law governs the
contractual validity of forum-selection clauses is that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
91. See id. at 318 (arguing that “[i]n general, Congress’ choice to enact substantive legislation in a
particular area creates a federal interest that is more than merely adjudicative and that, therefore,
justifies federal lawmaking on related issues left unanswered by the relevant statute” and that this
explains “why the Erie doctrine is largely absent from federal question cases”).
92. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
93. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
94. See id. at 590 (“[T]his is a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the
forum-selection clause we scrutinize.”); Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 (“We believe this is the correct
doctrine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”); see also Steinman, supra note
49, at 319 n.411 (arguing that federal common law in admiralty cases “is grounded in precisely the kind
of uniquely federal interest that justifies substantive federal common law in other areas” (citing S. Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (describing the need to prevent state law from “interfer[ing]
with the proper harmony and uniformity of [general maritime law] in its international and interstate
relations”)). Although the prevailing view is that federal judicial lawmaking is justified in maritime
cases, that view has not been immune from scholarly critique. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption
at Sea, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1999) (noting that “admiralty is often assumed to be the
paradigm case of truly legitimate federal common law” but arguing that maritime cases should not be
exempt from Erie).
95. See infra Part V.
96. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
97. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
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federalizes the issue. In Stewart, after all, the majority held that “federal
law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), governs the District Court’s decision
whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause and transfer
this case . . . .”98
Through the lens of Erie, the presence of a federal statute is
significant whether we view forum-selection clauses as implicating Erie’s
constitutional core (protecting state law substantive rights) or the subErie inquiry into forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws.
A federal statute can eliminate the potential constitutional problem
because the Supremacy Clause itself allows a federal statute to trump
state law.99 For the same reason, a federal statute can eliminate the need
to engage Erie’s twin aims. Indeed, the same decision that first
articulated the twin aims test—Hanna v. Plumer—also explained how
federal positive law changes the Erie inquiry. While the twin aims are
dispositive for a “relatively unguided Erie choice,”100 a federal statute
“must be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ authority
under the Constitution.”101
There are several reasons to question the notion that § 1404(a) can
trump state law with respect to the validity of forum-selection clauses.
First, that view ignores aspects of the Erie doctrine that have been
brought into sharper focus in the quarter century since Stewart was
decided. Second, it is undermined—at least implicitly—by the Atlantic
Marine decision itself. And third, it overlooks potential constitutional
concerns.
When a party invokes federal positive law—whether a federal
statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to preempt the standard
Erie analysis, there is a crucial threshold question: does that federal
positive law actually “control” the particular issue for which the other
party is invoking state law? The Supreme Court has framed this inquiry
in a number of ways: whether the issue is “covered by” the statute or
98. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988); see also Jumara v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877–78 (3d Cir. 1995) (“In federal court, the effect to be given a contractual forum
selection clause in diversity cases is determined by federal not state law.”).
99. Even if § 1404(a) eliminates the constitutional problem, one could still argue that it should be
read to incorporate state law with respect to contract validity. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403
U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (“In the determination of ownership [for purposes of federal income tax liability],
state law controls.”); see also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (“Whether
latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress.
Even where there is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance, it must be
remembered that ‘Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the states . . . .’”
(quoting Henry M. Hart & Herbert Wechsler, the Federal Courts and the Federal System 435
(1953))). The inquiry into whether state law should be employed when applying a federal statute is
analogous to the question of whether state law should be incorporated into federal common law. See
Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68–69.
100. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
101. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 31–32.
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rule; whether the statute or rule “answers the question in dispute”;
whether the scope of the statute or rule “is sufficiently broad to control
the issue before the Court”; whether the “clash” between state law and
the federal statute or rule is “unavoidable”; whether the federal statute
or rule “leav[es] no room for the operation of state law”; and whether
the federal statute or rule and state law “can exist side by side, each
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.”102 Or
as Justice Ginsburg put it recently: “Is this conflict really necessary?”103
In the quarter century since Stewart, the Court has emphasized
that—when undertaking this inquiry—federal courts must interpret
positive federal law (whether a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure) to accommodate state law, provided the statute or rule is
flexible or ambiguous enough to do so.104 If the text of the federal statute
or rule does not itself dictate a result that is contrary to state law, the
choice should be treated as a “relatively unguided Erie choice;”105 that is,
the federal statute or rule must be applied in a way that is consistent with
state law if doing otherwise would offend the “twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.”106
A good example of this was the 1996 decision in Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc.107 There, the Court recognized that Federal Rule 59
governed a defendant’s post-trial motion challenging a jury’s damage
award as excessive. Because of Erie, however, federal courts were
required to use the state law standard for evaluating such damage awards
(in that case, New York’s “deviates materially” standard)—rather than
the traditional federal approach that allowed a new trial only when the
award was so excessive as to “shock the conscience.”108 Gasperini reasoned
that Rule 59 itself did not impose the shock-the-conscience standard that
had long applied in federal court: “Whether damages are excessive for
the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no
candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the
claim for relief—here, the law of New York.”109 Accordingly, Gasperini
rejected the idea that Rule 59 created “a ‘federal standard’ for new trial
motions in ‘direct collision’ with, and ‘leaving no room for the operation

102. Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady
Grove, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1131, 1135–36 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 437 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657 (1959)).
104. See Steinman, supra note 102, at 1144–53.
105. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
106. Id. at 468.
107. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
108. See id. at 437 n.22; see also Steinman, supra note 49, at 283–84.
109. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22.
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of,’ a state law like [New York’s].”110 More recently, in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,111 all nine Justices
endorsed the view that, for Erie purposes, Federal Rules should be
construed—if possible—to avoid substantial variations in outcomes
between state and federal cases.112
Section 1404(a)’s standard for transferring venue—“[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice”113—is
flexible enough to allow a federal court to give force to a forum-selection
clause that would be binding as a matter of state law. As Atlantic Marine
itself recognized, “[i]n all but the most unusual cases, . . . ‘the interest of
justice’ is served by holding parties to their bargain.”114 This insight also
applies in cases where state law would deem a forum-selection clause to
be contractually invalid. Even if one accepts that the selection of a forum
by the parties will satisfy § 1404(a)’s requirements for a transfer to that
forum, the statute is open ended enough to accommodate state law
regarding whether the parties have truly selected that forum as a matter
of contract law. Either way, the key inquiry would become whether
allowing a federal court to reach a different conclusion than the state court
about the contractual validity of a forum-selection clause is likely to
encourage forum shopping or lead to inequitable administration of the
laws.
To view § 1404(a) as federalizing contractual validity is also in
tension with some of the reasoning in Atlantic Marine—in particular, the
Court’s view that its approach applies with equal force when a forumselection clause “call[s] for a nonfederal forum.”115 As Justice Alito
recognized, “§ 1404(a) ha[d] no application” in this context, because that
provision authorizes a transfer only to another federal district or division.
Instead, forum-selection clauses that specify a state or foreign court may
be enforced using “the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens.”116

110. Id. (quoting id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Thus, Gasperini squarely refutes a key premise
of Stewart: that accommodating state law is problematic because “it makes the applicability of a
federal statute depend on the content of state law.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31
n.10 (1988). After Gasperini, it is clear that a federal rule or statute can be applied differently
depending on the content of state law.
111. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
112. See, e.g., id. at 405 n.7. The Shady Grove majority ultimately concluded that Rule 23 was not
susceptible to a reading that could accommodate state law. Id. (“[T]here is only one reasonable
reading of Rule 23.”). Four Justices, in dissent, found that Rule 23 could be read to avoid a conflict
with state law. See id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But it was neither argued nor considered, in
Shady Grove, whether state law might play a role in the application of Rule 23’s requirements. See
Steinman, supra note 102, at 1144.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
114. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013).
115. Id. at 576.
116. Id. at 581.
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Nonetheless, Atlantic Marine explained that “because both § 1404(a)
and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives entail the
same balancing-of-interests standard, courts should evaluate a forumselection clause pointing to a nonfederal forum in the same way that they
evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to a federal forum.”117
However, there is no Act of Congress that federalizes the forum non
conveniens doctrine. That Atlantic Marine treated § 1404(a) and forum
non conveniens as identical vehicles for enforcing a forum-selection
clause indicates that the presence of a federal statute itself cannot be what
resolves whether state or federal law governs the contractual validity of a
forum-selection clause.
Here is one final observation on whether § 1404(a) authorizes
federal courts to displace state contract law. Although Acts of Congress
are often viewed as a federalizing, anti-Erie trump card, it is worth
considering whether Erie places limits on congressional authority as
well.118 Justice Brandeis’ reasoning in Erie, after all, contemplated a
constitutional principle that constrained both Congress and the federal
courts: “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”119
What constitutional limit on congressional authority did Justice
Brandeis have in mind? This has long been a mystery—and it has earned
Erie considerable criticism.120 There is, however, a plausible legislative
counterpart to Erie: Just as federal courts may not displace substantive
state law simply because they have jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular
case,121 Congress may not pass a law that displaces substantive state law
solely on the basis that federal courts might have jurisdiction over cases
concerning those substantive areas of law.122 And just as federal courts
may not override substantive state law under the guise of developing
procedural rules,123 Congress may not pass a law that overrides state
substantive law solely because it wants to establish procedures for federal
courts.124 The parallel between these judicial and legislative constraints
fits with Justice Brandeis’ logic in Erie, yet it would not upset

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
See Steinman, supra note 49, at 317 n.399, 322 n.420.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie As the Worst Decision of
All Time, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 129, 143 (2011) (“It is doubtful that Erie’s federalism limitation on congressional
power was correct when it was decided, and doctrinal developments have made it even less valid.”).
121. See Steinman, supra note 49, at 316.
122. See id. at 317 n.399, 322 n.420 (questioning whether Congress can enact substantive law solely
because of its “power to regulate the business of the federal courts” or “on the basis that federal courts
might adjudicate claims concerning those substantive areas of law”).
123. See id. at 316–17.
124. See id. at 317 n.399, 322 n.420.
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contemporary views of congressional power. Congress would retain
authority to make substantive law pursuant to other enumerated powers
(for example, the Commerce Clause).125 The legislative counterpart to
Erie that I suggest here is simply that Congress’s power vis-à-vis the
federal judiciary—standing alone—does not justify displacing substantive
rights created by state law.
This view would be in some tension with the dicta in Hanna that
the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by
the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts,
which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are
rationally capable of classification as either.126

It would certainly conflict with more aggressive readings of congressional
authority in this regard, such as John Hart Ely’s famous example that
Congress could impose a substantive “no-fault system” for all diversityjurisdiction accident cases on the “procedural” theory that “keeping
accident cases out of federal courts will clear their dockets so that they
can do juster justice in other cases.”127
But the Supreme Court has yet to approve anything along the lines
of Ely’s hypothetical. Indeed, just a few years before Hanna’s dicta on
this issue, the Court spoke in much more skeptical terms. The Court
noted in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America128 that the defendant’s
proposed interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act—which would
have compelled a different result in federal court than state court as to
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement—raised constitutional
concerns because “Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to
controversies in diversity of citizenship cases.”129 More recently, the
Supreme Court has suggested that federalism concerns may demand a
narrower view of Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper

125. See id. at 322 n.420.
126. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965).
127. Ely, supra note 6, at 706 n.77.
128. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
129. Id. at 201–02. In the decades since Bernhardt, the Supreme Court has clarified that the
constitutional authority for the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the Commerce Clause, not
Congress’s power over the federal judiciary. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“The
Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the
Commerce Clause.”). That has seemingly eliminated the potential Erie problem with the FAA, and
has given the FAA an even more sweeping scope insofar as it now binds state courts as well as federal
courts. See id. at 16 (holding that the FAA “creat[ed] a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts”). The Erie concern remains, however, for § 1404(a)—which is not based on Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32 (noting that § 1404(a)’s constitutional
basis is “Congress’s powers under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause”).
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Clause.130 All of this suggests that § 1404(a)—an unquestionably procedural
statute based solely on Congress’s authority vis-à-vis the federal courts—
should not be a basis for overriding substantive state law.

V. Extraordinary Circumstances: When Might a Federal Court
Refuse to Enforce a Valid Forum-Selection Clause?
Justice Alito recognized that there may be some “extraordinary
circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties” that would
permit a federal court to deny a § 1404(a) motion despite a contractually
valid forum-selection clause.131 A decision to disregard a valid forumselection clause, however, must be justified by “public-interest factors
only”132—factors that may include “the administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home; [and] the interest in having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is at home with the law.”133
Justice Alito provided no concrete examples of when the public
interest factors might warrant a refusal to enforce a contractually valid
forum-selection clause, except to say that they would be “exceptional,”134
“extraordinary,”135 “rare[]”136 and “unusual.”137 It should be kept in
mind, however, that a party contesting a forum-selection clause need
only establish the presence of such “extraordinary circumstances” if the
clause is valid under state law. Many potential objections to a forumselection clause might be vindicated by the state law inquiry into contractual
validity.
Assuming that the forum-selection clause is contractually valid
under state law, the question, as viewed through the lens of Erie, should
be framed as follows: When can a federal court legitimately displace
substantive rights created by state contract law? One answer is that a
uniquely federal interest can justify a federal judicial override of state
substantive law. This notion is reflected in the “classic” federal common

130. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–22 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 156–57 (1992); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
131. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013).
132. Id. at 582.
133. Id. at 581 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6
(1981)); see supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 581 (“[N]o such exceptional factors appear to be present in this case.”).
135. Id. (“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties
should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”).
136. Id. at 582 (“[T]hose factors will rarely defeat a transfer motion . . . .”).
137. Id. (“[T]he practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.”).
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law cases,138 as well as the Supreme Court’s pre-Hanna decision in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative.139
One could certainly articulate a relationship between some of the
public interest factors identified in Atlantic Marine and the sort of
federal interests that might justify an override of state substantive law in
the context of a forum-selection clause.140 If, for example, especially
severe “court congestion”141 was present in the selected federal district,
there might be a unique federal interest in avoiding further burdens on
that district. Relatedly, severe congestion or some other emergency
could deprive the contractually chosen district of the practical ability to
adjudicate the case, which could undermine the integrity of the federal
judicial process.142 It might be a more difficult argument that there is a
uniquely federal interest in “having localized controversies decided at
home” or “having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the law.”143 These interests would seem to be just as strong—if not
stronger—with respect to a state court that is asked to dismiss a case
away based on a forum-selection clause. But just to be clear: if the state
court would vindicate these interests by refusing to enforce the forumselection clause, Erie should require the federal court to do the same (for
all the reasons described earlier).144

138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
139. 356 U.S. 525, 537–39 (1958) (stating that “countervailing” interests such as “the essential
character or function of a federal court” might justify a federal rule notwithstanding an effect on the
outcome that would otherwise be unacceptable under Erie).
140. It should be remembered, of course, that Piper’s list of public interest factors (and private
interest factors, for that matter) was never meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
562 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (11th Cir. 2009) (“These factors are not exhaustive or dispositive, and courts
are free to be flexible in responding to cases as they are presented.”).
141. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6 (recognizing “administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion” as a public interest factor).
142. The idea that the integrity of the federal judicial process might be a federal interest that
justifies departing from state law finds support in Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. See 531
U.S. 497, 509 (2001). Relying on Erie, Semtek recognized that decisions by federal courts sitting in
diversity should ordinarily have the same preclusive effect as decisions of the state courts where the
federal court is located. Id. at 508–09. It recognized, however, that:
[S]tate law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with
federal interests. If, for example, state law did not accord claim-preclusive effect to
dismissals for willful violation of discovery orders, federal courts’ interest in the integrity of
their own processes might justify a contrary federal rule.

Id. at 509.
143. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6.
144. If the state court would enforce the forum-selection clause—and the federal court therefore
transfers the case under § 1404(a)—it is also conceivable that the contractually designated federal
district might then transfer the case under § 1404(a) to a district that is more “at home” with the
dispute and the law that would govern it. This would hold the parties to their enforceable bargain that
the case be filed in the selected district, but would still allow the federal judiciary to manage where—
within the federal judicial system as a whole—is the most suitable venue to ultimately adjudicate the
case. That second transfer would not be compelled as a matter of contract law, so it would not
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Conclusion: ATLANTIC MARINE and State Law
Where does this leave us? Erie is a notoriously complex and
unpredictable area of law. It is clear, however, that the potential Erie
concerns described above would disappear with one simple clarification
of the Atlantic Marine framework: For purposes of Atlantic Marine’s
footnote 5—at least for diversity cases—a forum-selection clause is
contractually valid if and only if it would be deemed valid and
enforceable by the state court where the federal district court is located.
This refinement solves the Erie relocation problem, because the
federal court will transfer the case under Atlantic Marine only when a
state court would provide a similar remedy. And it solves the Erie
horizontal choice-of-law problem because the law-changing Atlantic
Marine transfer will only occur if the state court would, pursuant to the
forum-selection clause, dismiss the case for refiling in the contractually
designated forum.145 And it solves the Erie vertical substantive law
implicate the vertical substantive law concern described above. See supra notes 84–86 and
accompanying text. And that second transfer would not entail any change to the substantive law,
because it would be subject to the usual Van Dusen rule for § 1404(a) transfers. Thus, it would not implicate
the horizontal choice-of-law concern described above. See supra notes 71–83 and accompanying text.
145. This understanding may also pave the way toward a more coherent general theory of how
federal courts should handle choice-of-law questions when a case moves from one federal district to
another. Prior to Atlantic Marine, the prevailing view was that for a § 1404(a) transfer, the transferee
court must use the law that would apply in the state where the case was originally filed; but for a
§ 1406(a) transfer, the transferee court must use the law that would apply in its own state. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980) (“If an action is transferred under § 1404(a), the
state law of the transferor court should be applied. In contrast, if an action is transferred under
§ 1406(a), the state law of the transferee district court should be applied.”). At first blush, Atlantic
Marine seems to create an inelegant exception this rule by declaring that a venue-transfer motion
based on a forum-selection clause is governed by § 1404(a) but must be treated like a § 1406 motion
for purposes of choice of law. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
Under an Erie-driven approach, however, there is no need for either an arbitrary line
between § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) transfers or an arbitrary exception to that line for forum-selection
clauses. Rather, the key question is: what law would ultimately have governed the case without the
“accident” of diversity jurisdiction? See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. In other words, if
the case had been filed in a state court in the state where the transferor court was located, what would
have happened? See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639 (noting that, under Erie, “the critical identity to be
maintained is between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in
which the action was filed” (emphasis added)). Understood this way, Atlantic Marine’s choice-of-law
rule for transfers based on a forum-selection clause presumes that a state court would dismiss the case
pursuant to the forum-selection clause, after which the case would be refiled in the contractually
selected state and be subject to that state’s choice-of-law rules. Van Dusen’s choice-of-law rule
presumes that a state court (in which § 1404(a) does not apply) would keep the case and therefore
would have applied its own choice-of-law rules. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Indeed,
Van Dusen explicitly left open the possibility that a different approach to choice of law following a
§ 1404(a) transfer might be needed if it could be shown that the state court would have dismissed the
case on forum non conveniens grounds. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 640 (“We do not attempt to
determine whether . . . the same considerations would govern . . . if it was contended that the transferor
State would simply have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.”). While it is
beyond the scope of this article to explore this theory further, it provides a potentially fruitful
alternative to one focused solely on which venue transfer statute—§ 1404(a) or § 1406(a)—applies.
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concern because the federal court would not displace state contract law
with its own approach.
Accordingly, Atlantic Marine should not be read to impose a rigid,
pro-enforcement rule for forum-selection clauses. It should not be read
to disregard legitimate concerns about whether parties have meaningfully
consented to such clauses in particular cases, or about the use of such
clauses to constrain consumers or other parties with minimal bargaining
power and no practical means to negotiate with the more powerful party.
Rather, courts applying Atlantic Marine should look to state law to
address these issues—as Erie requires.
This understanding places Justice Alito’s narrow view of the
“extraordinary circumstances” that justify disregarding a contractually
valid forum-selection clause into proper perspective. If the forumselection clause would not be enforced in state court, then Atlantic
Marine does not compel its enforcement in federal court. The extraordinary
circumstances Justice Alito described allow a federal court to refuse
enforcement of a forum-selection clause even where a state court would
find the clause valid and enforceable. And as described above, those
extraordinary circumstances might themselves be justified in terms of the
unique federal interests that can allow federal courts to displace state
law.146
There is nothing in the Atlantic Marine opinion that forecloses this
approach. Again, footnote 5 explicitly reserves the question of contract
validity. It does not prejudge the role that state law might play in that
regard, and there are strong arguments—as summarized above—that
Erie requires federal courts to follow state law. It is worth addressing,
however, some snippets of the Atlantic Marine opinion that might be
misconstrued to require a distinct, federal approach to questions of
contractual validity.
At one point in the opinion, Justice Alito stated that “when a
plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum—
presumably in exchange for other binding promises by the defendant—
the plaintiff has effectively exercised its ‘venue privilege’ before a dispute
arises.”147 One might argue that this language reflects a rule that federal
courts should “presum[e]” that forum-selection clauses are, in fact,
agreed to “in exchange for other binding promises,” and that federal
courts should therefore discount concerns that are legitimately addressed
by substantive contract law—consent, bargaining power, and the like.
That view, however, takes this sentence out of context. Again, the
Court’s entire analysis “presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection

146. See supra Part V.
147. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added).
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clause.”148 If the forum-selection clause is contractually valid—an inquiry
that is properly governed by state law—then this sentence from the
opinion simply recognizes such a contractually valid clause can restrict
the plaintiff’s “venue privilege.” It does not dictate a particular approach
to determining contractual validity in the first instance.
Later in the opinion, Justice Alito cited Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Stewart for the proposition that Bremen’s “reasoning
applies with much force to federal courts sitting in diversity.”149 Bremen,
of course, was a 1972 admiralty case where the Supreme Court adopted
an approach to forum-selection clauses that was more inclined toward
enforcement than “the traditional view of many American courts”—
which had often refused to enforce such clauses on the ground that they
improperly “oust the jurisdiction of the courts.”150 But Justice Kennedy’s
view in Stewart was this: “Though state policies should be weighed in the
balance, the authority and prerogative of the federal courts to determine
the issue, as Congress has directed by § 1404(a), should be exercised so
that a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling weight in all but
the most exceptional cases.”151 So Justice Kennedy’s view, as well, was
premised on the existence of a valid forum-selection clause. Moreover,
Justice Kennedy made this point in the context of Stewart’s understanding
that the substantive law would not change when a forum-selection clause
is enforced via § 1404(a).152 Under Atlantic Marine, a transfer based on a
forum-selection clause would change the substantive law that would
otherwise apply.153
Indeed, Justice Kennedy has been an interesting figure in Erie’s
evolution during the last quarter century. Not long after Stewart, Justice
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Ferens, in which he
emphasized that “§ 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law
advantages that exist absent diversity jurisdiction”154 and explained that
this policy “has its real foundation in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.”155
Indeed, his Ferens opinion explicitly embraced Justice Scalia’s Stewart
dissent, citing his view that “the language of § 1404(a) was ‘plainly
insufficient’ to work a change in the applicable state law through preemption.”156 Justice Kennedy also joined Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in Gasperini and her dissent in Shady Grove, both of which
148. Id. at 581 n.5.
149. Id. at 582 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
150. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
151. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
152. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 42–47, 71 and accompanying text.
154. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
155. Id. at 524.
156. Id. at 526 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see supra note 81.
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concluded that state law should prevail in federal court notwithstanding
the presence of federal positive law. As much as any Justice, Kennedy
has been receptive to applying the Erie doctrine in a way that
accommodates state law.
***
It is impossible to appreciate the full impact of Atlantic Marine
without taking Erie into account. As described above, the Atlantic Marine
decision leaves room for state law to play a significant role in
determining the ultimate effect of a forum-selection clause in federal
court. And forum-selection clauses raise several concerns that, under a
proper understanding of Erie, should require federal courts to follow
state law regarding whether such clauses must be enforced in particular
cases.
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